Recent news on Somalia, DRC, and other places...

I've been out of town and busy but I thought I'd just post some interesting news items I've missed while being out of town, not getting back to my hotel until I'd called Timor-Leste ( for work but there's 13 hour time difference) at least once every evening...and then coming back to the hotel where internet was $15 a day (the hotel itself was great otherwise, highly recommend the FitzPatrick Grand Central, which is across the street from Grand Central and it's market and right next door to a really nice little espresso bar--it's at East 44th and Lexington, the picture on that site is old, the minutemen press is now the espresso bar--seriously the coffee place really is a great place for breakfast).

Anyway, in Somalia, two DGSE agents were kidnapped by the Shabaab. They were on an official mission to train the TFG's intelligence service. Anyway, Le Monde reports that the captors were fighting over the prisoners so much they had to split them up because otherwise the captors would have killed each other. I understand the need for intelligence capacities when fighting an insurgency but really, TFG forces can't seem to hold more than a few blocks of Mogadishu so maybe training the forces in general would be a better start than intelligence capacity. Meanwhile, the Shabaab have overrun UN offices in Baidoa and the UN's small political mission there, along with UNDP, had to close up shop (sorry all the articles are in French).

Second, SRSG Alan Doss has this oped-in the Washington Times a few weeks ago. It reiterates the need for more troops for MONUC etc. He also mentions the need for FARDC discipline (duh), the need to pay the soldiers so they stop living off the population, and the recent UN Panels of Experts report that detailed foreign support to the FDLR (the May 2009 one discusses this).

And I think that's it for now!

Security Sector Reform--Good Practices Repository (updated/corrected)

Something to note: the publication of a repository of good practices in security sector reform. It looks at 7 governments, 11 international organizations, and several dozens NGOs and think tanks. The repository is a matrix that has 900 activities, over 190 documents and is cross-referenced for six main functional areas of SSR.

The topical areas: defense sector reform, doing SSR in stabilization environments, threat assessments and reviews, national security strategies and policies, governance and oversight of the security sector, and management of the security sector.

Still, you might want to bookmark the pub page or just download the doc to your machine since it links to over 190 relevant and interesting document. About 900 activities in SSR are listed and crossed referenced, with page numbers, across the 190 documents so if you're interested in something in particular, you can see which documents address that issue and then go and read it...

US Sending Weapons to Somalia (updated--again)

Another article in the Washington Post about how the US is supporting TFG forces in Somalia....

That's not anything new--there's even an exception to the long-standing arms embargo on Somalia for precisely that purpose (see S/RES/1744 of 21 February 2007, which permits member states to support the development of Somali Security forces).

Still, it's risky. The TFG isn't exactly the most stable and reliable of "governments."

This happens amidst talk of replacing the AU force in Somalia, AMISOM, with a UN force. In fact, the President's budget shifts funds for support to a mission in Somalia from the voluntary contributions account (PKO) to the assessed contributions to in international peacekeeping activities (CIPA) account. That's also alarming: it means the Administration is anticipating the the UN will take over for the AU (or that we'll have another UNAMID type mission in Somalia...). I wonder how the DPKO will get the troops it needs for that given that it's already having trouble finding enough troops for Darfur and the planned expansion in Eastern Congo. I don't think a whole of countries are going to want to send troops to Somalia, not when they'll likely not have the political backing (and let's be frank, in many cases, skills) to conduct counter-insurgency in Somalia. This could be really bad for UN peacekeeping...

Update 1: There's more in today's Washington Post: apparently the US has sent 40 tons of munitions to Somalia in the last six weeks...what exactly are we trying to achieve, because I'm not certain this will work.

Update 2: On Small Wars Journal, Robert Haddick talks about the history of failed US initiatives in Somalia and the need to learn from them.

Properly Funding SFA in Afghanistan

The New York Times had an editorial about this earlier this week. This seems pretty basic but worth saying, don't try and build security forces, whether police or armed forces if you don't plan on doing it right, spending enough money, and having enough advisers on the ground...

The Bush administration planned to increase the Afghan Army from 90,000 troops to 134,000. That still won’t be big enough to secure a vast, rugged country with a larger population than Iraq’s. American planners propose expanding it to as many as 260,000 troops — roughly the size of Iraq’s Army. No decision has yet been made.

The Pentagon estimates that it would cost $10 billion to $20 billion over a seven-year period to create and train a force that size. Paying it would cost billions more, especially if the current $100-a-month salary is to become more competitive with the $300 the Taliban pays.

The total bill would still be a lot smaller than the cost of sustaining a huge American fighting force there. By the end of this year, there will 68,000 American troops in Afghanistan, costing American taxpayers more than $60 billion a year.

Afghanistan’s national police force will have to be rebuilt almost from scratch. Kabul’s central government is notoriously corrupt, but the tales from the field are even more distressing. Journalists for The Times have reported seeing police officers burglarizing a home and growing opium poppies inside police compounds. American soldiers complain of police supervisors shaking down villagers, skimming subordinates’ wages and selling promotions and equipment. Muhammad Hanif Atmar, the interior minister, has pushed for greater accountability by senior police officials. He has a lot of work ahead of him.

Several thousand more police trainers with experience in civilian law enforcement are needed. European NATO members can and should be providing more help.

Violence against civilians in DRC

This article is fascinating but it's also horrible. It's about the FARDC operations to clear FDLR (or I guess what used to be joint FARDC-CNDP earlier this year but with integration, that's changed) and how civilians have been affected by these operations.:

Villagers say soldiers are killing people accused of collaborating with the rebels. And in scenes that conjure the brutalities of Belgian colonial rule, commanders are forcing locals to carry supplies across the forest, killing those who collapse from exhaustion.

"Pastors, teachers, students, everyone must carry, and not for one day, for weeks," said Kalinda Hangi, a former teacher who has filled a notebook with names of people killed by the rebels and the army in his area. "They make you build their tents, take water -- if you don't obey, they kill you."

This apparently refers to former CNDP forces about whom DRC authorities said this:

A spokesman for the Congolese army, Col. Seraphin Mirindi, said the army is stepping up efforts to prosecute such abuses.

But he defended the participation in the operation of Bosco Ntaganda, the man known as the Terminator, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court for allegedly conscripting child soldiers and is separately accused of commanding militiamen who killed at least 800 civilians in 2002.

"In Congo, there are general interests and particular interests," Mirindi said.

"The peace is a general interest in Congo. Bosco is a particular interest. For now, we are arresting people who are committing crimes during this operation. For the rest, after this war, there will be time to act," Mirindi added.

Ok, what's that supposed to mean? This is the sort of compromise we're making? Meanwhile, civilians are getting killed and abused by the government forces, rebel forces are retaliating (something to be expected):

"They told people, 'You are bringing these troops to hunt us, now we will hunt you,' " said Bahavu, who eventually made his way to a sprawling camp of banana-leaf huts.

So if all of this doesn't make you think the world is beyond messed up, I don't know what will. One thing is pretty obvious, why are we tolerating this from the Congolese authorities?

More on DRC and SSR

This Reuters article has some interesting analysis on why SSR is failing in DRC.

By Joe Bavier

HOMBO, Congo, June 19 (Reuters) - The failure of efforts by Congo and its foreign backers to forge an army from former belligerents is straining the latest peace deal near to breaking point and threatens to undermine the government's authority.

Donor nations and the largest ever U.N. peacekeeping force helped organise 2006 elections meant to usher in a new era of peace and investment in the nation that has vast mineral resources but has been plagued by years of conflict.

But Congo's army remains in tatters, with foreign security sector reform plans still unimplemented and army units, cobbled together from various pro- and anti-government factions, often accused of war crimes and worsening the humanitarian crisis.

Operations begun under a deal with former foe Rwanda aimed at ending a rebellion by Congolese Tutsi CNDP rebels and rooting out Rwandan Hutu FDLR rebels have stalled. Some unpaid soldiers have mutinied, others have turned their guns on the U.N. force.

"The main short-term risk is that the fragile integration of the CNDP could be threatened by the lack of payments and infighting in the army and put in danger the peace process," said Jason Stearns, a Congo analyst.

"It's also exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and undermining the operations against the FDLR."

Despite the end of the Tutsi rebellion led by dissident General Laurent Nkunda until his arrest in January, the United Nations says a further 800,000 civilians have been forced from their homes this year.

A return to conflict could also undermine the improving relations with Rwanda and further set back chances of bringing formal investment to develop mineral resources plundered during wars that left an estimated 5.4 million dead since 1988.

The latest attempt to integrate rebels into the army is far from being the first to founder.

A plan to create a united army of 36,000 soldiers before the 2006 election came to little despite help from the United States, former colonial ruler Belgium, South Africa and Angola.

Another plan to create 12 rapid reaction battalions last year never got off the ground. Attempts to rid the army of crippling mismanagement and corruption have also failed, leaving troops ill-equipped and salaries unpaid.



PLUNDER

"It's endemic. The commanders get the money and don't give it to their soldiers," said Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Paul Dietrich, military spokesman the U.N. mission in Congo.

Unpaid soldiers are forced to live off the populations they are meant to be protecting. In frustration at their poor conditions, some soldiers had even opened fire on U.N. peacekeepers who are supposed to be assisting them, he said.

Military analysts say the January peace deal that integrated thousands of Tutsi rebels and militia members into the army to fight the Hutu rebels had made matters worse, as units are now composed along ethnic lines, blocking reform attempts.

As a result, many local communities are seeking protection from traditional militia, such as the Mai Mai, which have long fought to defend local communities from other armed groups.

"It's better to stay with the Mai Mai than to be with the Congolese army. If the Mai Mai are here, at least we are protected," said Dynamic Kanguaka, a village chief near Hombo, as local gunmen readying for a patrol gathered to be sprinkled with water, Mai Mai protection from the enemy's bullets.

In the face of the criticism over the behaviour of the armed forces, Congo's government puts the blame elsewhere.

"The support we are receiving is not enough. The international community must help us 100 percent," Information Minister Lambert Mende told Reuters.

But the failure to bring peace to the east and to keep the army under control is undermining Kabila in a stronghold that was key to his victory in the 2006 election despite opposition in the capital Kinshasa and much of western Congo.

Already struggling to shore up a mining-dependent economy that has taken a battering from the global economic crisis, political analysts believe Kabila's own future could be in doubt unless he is able to take control of the security situation.

"Kabila has been caught up in an endless cycle of negotiations with armed groups in the east. The only arrow in his quiver is to co-opt these groups into the army," Stearns said.

"In the long-term, it's going to threaten his legitimacy and prolong the conflict in eastern Congo," he added.

Well, that sounds great...so what now? how do you prevent that from happening? I guess one of the things is making sure the soldiers get paid and then we're back to discussions of pacifying vs. building armies...(armee pacificatrice et armee batisseuse). And one more thing, if you want to read the December 2008 Report of the UN Panel of Experts on DRC (on which Stearns served, you can find that here). Crisis Group recently argued that the report led to the deal between DRC and Rwanda on Nkunda.

FARDC and CNDP integration

So, this is what happens, when you decide on "fast track integration" of forces in DRC. Honestly, I'm surprised it took this long.

The BBC reports that:

A UN base in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has been fired on by army soldiers in a dispute over pay.

It is the latest in a string of mutinies in North Kivu by soldiers who have not been paid for six months.

A senior UN peacekeeper told the BBC that army commanders are not handing over soldiers' wages.

The army and UN forces are conducting an offensive in the region against ethnic Hutu rebels many of whom fled to DR Congo after the Rwandan genocide.

A UN spokesman told the BBC the situation needed to be dealt with urgently.

"There is a risk of a potential disintegration of the Congolese army," he said.

Over the last few months, members of the Tutsi-dominated rebel militia, the Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), have been integrated into the national army.

"There has been a fast-track integration of the CNDP and we are now seeing the results. The commanders are getting the money but not distributing it," the UN spokesperson said.

How is this surprising in any way? Honestly, integration consisted of gathering these troops and telling them, "congratulations, you're FARDC now!" It's not like FARDC was the most disciplined, well-paid and professional force either. In fact, Congolese civilians reportedly fear government soldiers just as much, if not more, than other forces. Did the authorities not think that the pervasive payment problems